Beyond zero: transparency in the Bank of Japan’s monetary policy by Ed Stevens
T he Bank of Japan is the central bank
of Japan. Its Policy Board has attracted
considerable attention because of the
unusually low levels of the overnight
interest rate—the call rate in the market
for unsecured overnight loans of
deposits at the Bank—associated with its
policy.1 The Board had targeted a call
rate of only 50 basis points (bp) for three
years (September 1995 to September
1998) when it eased the target to 25 bp,
and then to zero in February 1999. This
“zero-interest-rate policy” was inter-
rupted in August 2000 when, in a much-
noted reversal, the Bank of Japan raised
the target to 25 bp. But that target was
lowered again to 15 bp in February of
this year before switching to a quantity
target in March, which the Bank expects
once more to be consistent with a zero
call rate. 
For a central bank to maintain a zero or
near-zero interest rate policy is unusual
to say the least, but so, too, are Japan’s
economic circumstances. The Japanese
economy is said to have been in a “funk”
since its “bubble economy” of the 1980s
burst. Growth in output and employment
has been halting. In response, substantial
doses of fiscal stimulus have added huge
sums to government deficits and debt.
After the financial market shocks of
1998, hopeful stirrings of growth were
visible. However, in the wake of the cur-
rent global slowdown, that optimism
appears to have been swallowed up in
renewed economic softness and defla-
tion. Avariety of prescriptions for eco-
nomic and financial structural reforms
have been suggested to enliven the
Japanese economy, including monetary
policy actions that go beyond maintain-
ing a zero call rate.
The call rate in Japan is the counterpart
of the overnight federal funds rate in the
United States. The substantial degree of
apparent policy ease in Japan since 1998
can be seen when that nation’s zero or
near-zero call rate is compared with the
Federal Open Market Committee’s 
current 3.75 percent funds rate target.
“Apparent” is an important qualification
here, because of differences in inflation
rates. In the United States, the chain
index of prices for consumer expendi-
tures rose at a 2.2 percent annual rate in
the year ending in April 2001. As an esti-
mate of the expected future rate of infla-
tion, this suggests that the “real” infla-
tion-adjusted policy rate of interest was
about 1.6 percent. Over the same period
in Japan, consumer prices fell at a 0.5
percent rate. Using this as an estimate of
the expected rate of deflation roughly
corresponds to a real policy rate of inter-
est in Japan of 0.5 percent. 
In addition to suggesting the two policy
rates are closer together than they might
appear, these comparisons also highlight
an important feature of monetary policy:
The Bank of Japan was seemingly pow-
erless to ease policy any further once the
call rate target had been eased to a zero
nominal rate, because policy cannot
beget a negative nominal interest rate.
Other aspects of monetary policy, how-
ever, such as the degree of transparency
with which policy is conducted, might
enhance its efficiency.
Policy decisions should be transparent.
That is, most theorists acknowledge that,
although secret policy actions eventually
will have an impact, it is more efficient
for policymakers to make their decisions
known.2 This enables the public to avoid
wasting resources ferreting out the
stance of policy. Moreover, greater trans-
parency should provide a basis for the
public to form more accurate expecta-
tions about the future course of policy—
again, to avoid wasting resources
through market decisions that are based
on invalid assumptions about the future.
This feature of monetary policy is
addressed here by describing five
episodes during the past three years in
which the Bank of Japan attempted to
improve its communications with the
public. The period begins with perhaps
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Japan’s economy has problems that,
undoubtedly, are more complex than
monetary policy might be expected to
solve. But other kinds of policy
actions stand a better chance of suc-
cess when monetary policy is trans-
parent. Transparency means that
market participants’anticipations of
central bank actions are congruent
with those of policymakers them-
selves. The Bank of Japan has made
repeated efforts toward greater
transparency since achieving inde-
pendence in 1998.the most significant of all changes in
recent Japanese monetary policy. On
April 1, 1998, as a result of the Bank of
Japan Law of 1997, the Bank of Japan
ceased existence as an institution tied
closely to the Ministry of Finance and
began operations as an independent cen-
tral bank. Independence loosened the
institutional link between central bank
and government, which might have been
interpreted as risking inflationary moneti-
zation of large fiscal deficits.3According
to Article 2 of the same law, “currency
and monetary control shall be aimed at,
through the pursuit of price stability, con-
tributing to the sound development of the
national economy.” Ageneral objective
for central bank policy is clearly stated,
even though no precise definition of price
stability is given. Finally, Article 20 of the
Bank of Japan Law mandates a basic
degree of transparency:
After each Board meeting for monetary
control matters, the chairman shall, 
without delay, prepare a document which
contains an outline of the discussion at the
meeting in accordance with the decisions
made by the Board, and publish the docu-
ment upon its approval at another Board
meeting for monetary control matters.
  Transparency and 
Expectations
Even before April 1998, the Bank of
Japan had introduced the framework
within which monetary policy decisions
would be made as well as made known.
This initial framework included an
intention to publish a number of docu-
ments:
• Six-month-ahead announcements
of its twice-monthly meetings 
• Announcements of policy decisions
immediately after each meeting
• Monthly reports of the Policy
Board’s view of recent economic
and financial developments (two
business days after the first meeting
in a month) 
• Meeting minutes (typically five
weeks following each meeting) 
• Detailed meeting transcripts “after
a period of time,” since determined
to be 10 years.
In addition, the Bank publishes daily
estimates of the supply of its current
account balance liabilities, providing
market participants with a perspective
on call market conditions and daily open
market operations. All of this published
monetary policy information is readily
available on the Bank’s Web site,
www.BOJ.or.jp.
Throughout its new period of indepen-
dence, the Bank of Japan seems to have
moved deliberately toward greater 
transparency about its policy operations
and objectives. Transparency, of course,
cannot reveal what a central bank itself
does not know. The public’s economic
decisions are based on expectations for
the future, including future policy
actions. The price stability objective
stated in the 1997 law provides a foun-
dation for expectation formation that
should strengthen over time, if the
Bank’s actions are perceived as consis-
tent with price stability. However, even a
credible general objective can leave a lot
to the surmise of market decisionmakers. 
Policy actions may reflect anticipations
of future economic and financial condi-
tions rather than reactions to data
describing the past. The public will be
concerned with when, how, and how
much policy will move, and the extent
to which policymakers’anticipations of
economic and financial developments
are congruent with their own. 
Century Date Change 
Asimple example of an attempt to
assist expectation formation—common
to other central banks as well—came in
October 1999, in anticipation of poten-
tial century-date-change problems.
Market participants might have envi-
sioned computer and telecommunica-
tions failures that would prevent send-
ing or receiving funds needed for
financing. Such concerns already
appeared to be driving up interest rates
for term financing that spanned the end
of 1999. At its October 13 meeting, the
Bank of Japan acknowledged these
market concerns and took temporary
measures to reassure markets of its
commitment to provide ample funding
at year-end, should problems warrant; it
would do so by lending and by expand-
ing both the range of securities it might
acquire and the number of counterpar-
ties with which it would deal. In the
event, of course, Y2K came and went
without widespread problems.
On Current Monetary Policy 
Amore substantial example came earlier
in 1999. Intimations of economic recov-
ery appeared at the end of the summer,
but the exchange value of the yen had
surged for reasons that were not entirely
clear. The government was concerned
with combating yen appreciation. Its
representative at the September 21 
Policy Board meeting requested that the
Bank “give due consideration” to 
potential effects of appreciation on the
economy and “take appropriate mone-
tary policy measures.” The chairman of
the Policy Board had met with the 
minister of finance a few days previous,
a move that suggested to some that
agreement might have been reached for
special Bank of Japan assistance in
countering yen appreciation. Members
of the Policy Board discussed “how
monetary policy could be implemented
to deal with the yen’s appreciation,” a
process that typically involves easing
policy. Discussion moved on to how a
zero-interest-rate policy could be eased
any further, “the possibility that the 
market already expected the Bank to
take further policy action at the meet-
ing,” and “views on additional policy
measures.” The majority agreed that
maintaining the zero-interest-rate policy
was the appropriate decision. 
Minutes of the meeting, which would
have explained the Board’s reasoning,
were not scheduled to be released for
more than a month. “Members...dis-
cussed the relation between market
expectations and monetary policy in
view of the possibility that the market
already expected the Bank to take fur-
ther policy action at the meeting.” Some
members observed that “the Bank’s 
policy decisionmaking process and the
degree of monetary easing under the
zero interest rate policy were not fully
understood. On these grounds, the mem-
bers suggested the release of a statement
on the current monetary policy, although
the policy was not changed, followed by
a press conference by the chairman.”
The result was the immediate release 
of On Current Monetary Policy, a con-
densed report of the Board’s discussion
of relevant issues that was intended to
bring greater consistency between 
central bank and market anticipations 
for the future. 
On Price Stability 
In mid-2000, economic conditions
appeared to be improving. The policy
announcement released after the July 17
meeting indicated that, although the
zero-interest-rate policy had not been
lifted, “the majority of the Policy Board
views that Japan’s economy is coming toa stage where deflationary concerns are
dispelled, which the Board have clearly
stated as the condition for lifting the
zero interest rate policy.” After its
August 11 meeting, the Bank
announced that not only had it ended
the zero rate policy, it also had rejected
a government request (a statutory right)
to postpone that decision. 
The summer of 2000 illustrates the
Bank of Japan’s efforts to achieve
greater transparency, not only about the
policy-decision process, but also about
a vexing policy problem: What is price
stability? The published minutes of
Policy Board meetings show that,
throughout 2000, members seriously
discussed the meaning of price stabil-
ity, reliable measurement of price 
levels, and the appropriate set of prices
to stabilize. All of these questions were
being addressed in a zero-interest-rate
environment where deflation and 
economic contraction were immediate
concerns. Anumber of staff research
papers addressed these questions,
drawing on a growing body of relevant
international academic research litera-
ture. In October 2000, the Bank of
Japan published a summary of its
understanding of the policy situation,
including major unanswered questions,
in On Price Stability.4
Outlook and Risk Assessment
One conclusion of On Price Stability
was that releasing the Policy Board
members’forecasts of the economy
and prices would give the public a
firmer basis for forming expectations
of future policy. These forecasts would
extend beyond the immediate future
typically covered in the Board’s
Monthly Report of Recent Economic
and Financial Developments and min-
utes of its policy deliberations. To
implement this, the Policy Board inau-
gurated publication of Outlook and
Risk Assessment of the Economy and
Prices, a twice-yearly release that must
be approved by a majority vote of the
Board. It elaborates on the Board’s out-
look for the economy, financial mar-
kets, and prices over the ensuing year
or so. The risk assessment discusses the
broad assumptions underlying the out-
look under the current stance of policy
and major factors that might alter the
outlook. Tables are appended to this
text that show the range of members’
numerical forecasts of the rate of
change of GDP, wholesale prices, and
consumer prices.
New Procedures for Policy 
Operations 
Throughout the Bank of Japan’s initial
three years, some policy commentators
suggested that a zero-interest-rate policy,
even richly communicated to the public,
could be eased further. These sugges-
tions included a quantitative, perhaps
ever-increasing target for growth of 
central bank money, supported by more
extensive outright purchases of long-
term government securities, and a 
quantitative target for the inflation rate.
On March 19, 2001, the Policy Board
communicated its intention to adapt 
policy operations in the direction of
these suggestions, “with a view to pre-
venting prices from declining continu-
ously as well as preparing a basis for
sustainable economic growth.”
First, the Bank replaced its target for
the overnight call rate with a target for
the quantity of current account balances
held at the Bank by financial institu-
tions. The initial target has been around
Y5 trillion, which exceeds the volume
of required reserve deposits by about
Y1 trillion, and is said to be comparable
to the actual volume of balances that
the Bank supplied when it was main-
taining a zero call rate. Moreover, the
Japanese central bank indicated its
intention to supply an even more ample
supply of balances “should there be a
risk of financial market instability, e.g.,
a rapid surge in liquidity demand.”
Compared to a zero-interest-rate target,
the Policy Board’s discussion suggests
the quantity target should ensure that,
when the economy and demand for
reservable deposits begin to pick up,
market demand should put upward
pressure on the call rate. Letting the
market “speak” in this way may fore-
stall any latent fears of future inflation.
Second, the Bank of Japan had been
limiting monthly purchases of long-
term Japanese government securities
to the amount by which currency grew.
This limit was relaxed, ensuring more
scope for maintaining current account
balances if, for example, extremely
low levels of money market interest
rates were to make bidders indifferent
to bidding in normal reserve supplying
operations. While relaxed, a limit
remains in the form of a cap on total
holdings of long-term govern-
ment securities equal to the total
outstanding amount of the Bank’s
currency liabilities. This can be
viewed as an assurance that the
Bank’s expansionary policy will
stick to the statutory price stabil-
ity objective and will not slide
into inflationary finance of large
government deficits.
Third, the Bank of Japan stated its
intention to maintain the new
quantity targeting procedure “until
the consumer price index (exclud-
ing perishables), on a nationwide
statistics [sic] registers stably [sic]
a zero percent or an increase year
on year.” This was an important
intention to communicate. When
the first zero-interest-rate policy
was adopted in February 1999, the
Bank set no quantifiable, publicly
observable condition for its dura-
tion. In policy discussion, empha-
sis remained on the immediate
economic and financial outlook.
The new condition implies that the
public will be able to see more
clearly when policy operations
might be expected to change.
  Conclusion
Japan’s economy has problems
that undoubtedly are more com-
plex than a central bank might be
expected to solve. In its short his-
tory of independence, however,
the Bank of Japan has shown con-
siderable flexibility in adjusting
the ways it communicates policy
intentions to the public. Making
monetary policy more transparent
represents on important contribu-
tion to a better future for the
Japanese economy.
  Footnotes
1. The effective floor under the
nominal call rate is slightly more
than zero, as measured on the
“ask” side of the market. This
reflects a cost of about 2 bp to
make a call loan.
2. Exceptions are developed in a
recent paper by Henrik Jensen,
“Optimal Degrees of Trans-
parency in Monetary Policy-
making, “University of Copen-
hagen and Centre for Economic
Policy Research, 2001.3. The 1997 law did not sever all institu-
tional connections between the Bank of
Japan and the government. The Bank
must report on Policy Board decisions to
the Diet every six months. More directly,
Article 19 says:
1. The Minister of Finance and the Minister of
Economic Planning Agency may, when nec-
essary, attend and express views at those
Board meetings for monetary control matters,
or each of them may designate a staff member
of his Ministry or Agency to attend and
express views at such meetings. 
2. The Minister of Finance (or his designated
delegate) and the Minister of Economic Plan-
ning Agency (or his designated delegate),
when attending the Board meetings for mone-
tary control matters, may submit proposals
regarding monetary control matters, or
request that the Board postpone a vote on
monetary control matters until the next Board
meeting of this type. 
3. If a request is made to postpone a Board vote
under the provisions of the preceding Para-
graph, the Board shall decide whether or not
to accommodate the request, in accordance
with the same voting procedures which apply
to other matters. 
Moreover, according to Article 51: 
1. Every fiscal period, the Bank of Japan shall
prepare a budget for general and administra-
tive expenses (those prescribed by a Cabinet
Order as not hampering the currency and
monetary control, hereinafter referred to as “a
current expenditure budget”), and submit it to
the Minister of Finance for his or her autho-
rization before the business year begins.
4. Planned research workshops in 2001,
specifically aimed at price-measurement
issues, were announced in March 2001.
This is a particularly hot topic because
some analysts contend that, as a mea-
sure of inflation, the rate of change in
the Japanese consumer price index is
biased upward. If so, a zero measured
rate of inflation effectively would
amount to deflation. However, others
contend there is a downward bias. Fur-
ther complicating the picture is the
extent to which movements in asset
prices (as well as output prices) should
be part of the price stability objective.
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